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The Microeconomics of Vessel Behavior:  A Detailed
Short-Run Analysis of the Effects of Regulation
LEE G. ANDERSON
University of Delaware
Abstract   A model is introduced which demonstrates how vessel owners choose
the optimal combination of trip length, gear used per day, and trips per season
under open access and under various types of regulation. The nature of the
model allows for an explicit analysis of current management tools (i.e., days at
sea and trip limits), which is not possible using a traditional composite effort
variable. The analysis describes the different margins along which inefficiencies
can be introduced by traditional regulations and demonstrates how vessel op-
eration and output will change in the short run. One new conclusion is that
while binding regulations will always reduce profitability, in some cases they
can actually increase annual output. In addition, the paper presents new in-
sights concerning vessel operation under IQs and ITQs.
Key words   Fisheries regulation, fishing trips, vessel behavior.
Introduction
It has been recognized virtually since the beginning of modern fisheries economics,
that while most traditional types of regulation may achieve, at least temporarily, an
increase in stock size, they will also increase the cost per unit of effort above what
is possible given existing technology and stock size (see Crutchfield 1956, 1961,
1979; McConnell and Norton 1978; Scott 1979; Beddington and Rettig 1983; OECD
1997). Alternatively, it is the increase in cost that reduces catch and, hence, allows
for stock growth. Most of the analysis, however, has been descriptive or in terms of
an aggregate biological equilibrium model focusing on a composite input “effort.”
As Wilen (1979, 1985) points out, there has been very little work on the
microeconomic analysis of individual vessel behavior under regulation. He stresses
the need to look at all margins along which output can be increased and at the effect
of restrictions on a subset of these margins on total output and on input use along
the nonregulated margins.
The effect of regulations will differ depending upon the amount of time avail-
able to change technology and for the effects on stock size to be felt. Although these
distinctions are sometimes blurred, especially when using comparative static analy-
sis with a Shaefer sustainable yield curve, economic analysis can be more useful to
policymakers if they are kept separate. While regulations can affect long-run capital
choice, in the short run, their effects will be changes in current operating decisions
of individual operators, which may mean cessation of fishing if returns cannot cover
variable costs. From a biological perspective, the reduction in harvest, and, hence,
the effect of stock growth, is important. From an economic perspective, the specific
types of inefficiencies introduced are the key elements.
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The purpose of this paper is to develop a microeconomic analysis of the short-
run effects of frequently used regulations on individual vessels. Following Homans
and Wilen (1997), the analysis will be positive rather than normative. The focus will
be on how vessels operate under open-access and various regulations rather than on
how it is possible to change open-access vessel and fleet behavior toward a rent
maximizing ideal. In order to do so, it is necessary to develop a model which allows for
an explicit analysis of the margins along which regulations are introduced (trip catch
limits, trip number limits, etc.) and at the same time is capable of looking at the tempo-
ral effects of regulations, such as season closures and total allowable catches (TACs).
Individual behavior will be modeled in a way that more closely portrays reality by look-
ing at the number and duration of fishing trips during a given period. The primary vari-
ables will be the number of fishing days on a fishing trip and the amount of gear
used each day. While there may be a multitude of inputs used in vessel operation
and gear setting and retrieval, they will not be explicitly modeled. It will be as-
sumed that these inputs will be used in accordance with the profit maximizing rule
that the ratios of marginal productivities and prices are equal. The analysis of gear
restrictions, which prevents input choices according to this rule, will be considered.
The model, described in more detail below, captures the essence of vessel operation
for many types of fisheries. It certainly serves the purpose of adding other dimen-
sions to traditional vessel models that consider a composite effort variable.
The analysis will be short-run (constant fixed inputs and stock size) for a num-
ber of reasons. First, it is useful to make an explicit distinction between the short-
and long-run effects to provide a clearer understanding of the types of inefficiencies
involved. In addition, while short-run analysis allows for specific conclusions de-
pending upon the assumptions, the extension to long-run analysis only allows for the
extra conclusion that regulations will tend to stimulate investment in those capital
structures that can increase profitability subject to the constraints imposed and the
margins which they affect. Elaboration of that conclusion requires a detailed analy-
sis of the specifics of a particular fishery.
The paper will proceed as follows. The first section will introduce the basic
model of trip behavior, demonstrating how boats choose the optimal combination of
trip length, days fishing per trip, and the amount of gear used per day under open
access. The next section discusses the assumptions of the model, taking into account
the realities of real-world operation. The main part of the paper uses the model to
discuss the effects of various regulations on vessel control variables and, hence, on
output. Both traditional and rights-based regulations are considered.
Basic Model of Trip Behavior
A fishing trip can be considered a combination of four activities: trip preparation,
steaming to the fishing grounds, fishing, and general vessel operation. Assuming
one fishing ground, let the trip profit function be1
ππ = (,, ) GdX (1)
where G is the amount of gear used per day, d is number of days fished on a trip,
and X is stock size. Let the first and second derivatives with respect to G, d, and X
be positive and negative, respectively. Seasonal profits are:
1 Extending the analysis to explicitly consider operation in space by considering more than one possible
fishing area adds several layers of complexity and is left for further research. For a useful introduction
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Π= + + π Dd d d s lo () (2)
where D is length of the fishing period, ds is the round-trip number of steaming days
to the fishing grounds, dlo is the number of layover days necessary to unload and
prepare for the next trip, and D/(d + ds + dlo) is the number of trips in the period.
Assuming that the season is short enough that discounting can be ignored, the first
order conditions for a seasonal profit maximum with respect to G and d are:
∂∂ = π G 0 (3)
∂∂− + + = ππ dd d d s lo () . 0 (4)
Let the solution to this set of equations be G* and d*. For a given stock size, the opti-
mal number of fishing days per trip, d*, occurs where the marginal profit per fishing
day (when the daily gear usage rate is G*) is equal to the average profit per day of a
fishing trip. There is an opportunity cost for continuing a trip another day because a
new trip could be started. When the marginal gain for the last fishing day on any trip
is equal to the average gain per day of any fishing trip, it is not possible to “reallo-
cate” a day from one trip to another and increase total profits.2 Note that while the
optimal d will depend upon G and X, it is invariant to D. To anticipate the analysis
below, note that in order to maximize profit per trip rather than profit per period, the
condition for G would not change, but the condition for d would be ∂π /∂ d = 0.3
2 The analysis will proceed on the assumption that changes in stock size over the season will have a neg-
ligible effect on profits, and optimal R and d remain the same over the fishing period. However, the mar-
ginal-average principle applies to the more general case whether the stock decreases over the season
only because of fishing, or it changes in a known way because of recruitment surges or migration. Since
at least part of stock change will be the result of fishing mortality, the analysis of individual behavior in
terms of an n-person, noncooperative game is appealing (see Wilen 1985). Such issues are left for fur-
ther research. The analysis here will consider only secular changes in stock size.
3 For comparison purposes, the optimal utilization of a fishery can be derived using the following dis-
crete-time, present-value Hamiltonian.
  
H =+ + [] −+ − + + [] {} nD d d d F C GX nD d d d R d s lo s lo () ( ) ( ) () πφ (A1)
where n is the number of vessels, G(X) is the growth rate of the fish stock, and FC is the annual fixed
cost. φ  is the costate variable, the interpretation of which is the marginal value of a unit of stock in
place. The first order conditions with respect to the control variables are:
   ∂∂ ⇒ − − ∂ ∂ = H R P VC R R () φ 0 (A2)
   ∂∂ ⇒ + − − [] ++ = ∂ ∂ −+ ++ H d d d P R VC d d d VC d C VC d d d s lo Rs lo d d s lo ( ) ( ) () ( ) () φ (A3)
   ∂∂ ⇒ − − − = H n P Rd FC () . φ VC 0 (A4)
Comparing equations (3a) and (4a′′ ) with (A2) and (A3) gives the familiar result that the price net of
user cost of stock must be used to determine the optimal levels of the control variables for any given
price and stock size. Equation (A4) states that vessels should enter the fishery until economic profits net
of user cost are equal to zero, whereas open-access vessels will enter until economic profits are zero.
While equations (3a) and (4a′′ ) are not strictly comparable to equations (A2) and (A3) because of the
lack of discounting in the single vessel analysis and the implicit assumption of perfect capital malleabil-
ity in the dynamic optimum analysis, the difference between open-access and optimal utilization can
now be seen. Under open access, at any given price level and stock size, vessels will produce too much
per day, and trip length will be too long. Also, by comparing equation (A4) with the open-access
bioeconomic equilibrium conditions, it can be seen that the open-access fleet size will tend to be too
large, and the stock size will tend to be too small. Note that while optimal utilization will call for less
output at any combination of X and P, the expansion path will be the same.Anderson 132
In order to explain trip behavior in more detail and to investigate the implica-
tions of equations (3) and (4) in terms of relative costs, assume a daily output func-
tion as follows:
RR G X = (, )
where the first and second derivatives of G and X are greater than zero, and less than
or equal to zero, respectively. Also assume that the trip variable cost is a separable
function of trip activities as follows:
VC =+ + C dVC G VC d d G d s () ( , )
where C = Csu + Clodlo. C is fixed cost for a trip, Csu is the set up cost, and Clo is the
daily wharfage and other costs for keeping the boat in port. VCG(G) is the variable
cost of using G amount of gear per fishing day. VCd(d, ds) is the daily variable cost
of operating the boat at sea, not including costs related to fishing. For a given fish-
ing area, ds is a parameter, d is the control variable. The daily cost of the fishing
activity does not vary with trip length. Assume that both VCG and VCd produce a U-
shaped average variable cost curve and an increasing marginal cost curve. The trip
profit function becomes:
π= − PRd VC (1a)
where P is the price of output. The equations for vessel operation become:
PR G V C G G ∂∂− ∂ ∂ = 0 (3a)
[] [ ] ( ) . PR VC VC d PRd d d d G d s lo −− ∂ ∂ =− + + VC (4a)
G* can be obtained from equation (3a), and d* can be determined by substituting G*
into equation (4a). The marginal profit per fishing day on the left-hand side of equa-
tion (4a) is the net revenue per day evaluated at G* minus the marginal cost of oper-
ating the boat another day. The right-hand side of equation (4a) is average profit per
trip day.
A little more economic insight can be obtained by rearranging equation (4a) as:
∂∂ = + + ++ + − + + VC d C VC d d d d d PR VC d d d dd s lo s lo Gs lo () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (4a′ )
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of extending a trip one more day, and the
right-hand side is the average daily cost of a trip which is the sum of the average
daily cost of operating the boat for the entire trip and the average opportunity cost
of the lost revenue for the nonfishing days. This says that in order to maximize peri-
odic profits, trip length should be where the average daily cost of boat operation, in-
cluding this opportunity cost, is minimized.
As a final step in this analysis, it is necessary to investigate the minimum condi-
tions for profitable operation. This would be straightforward if the analysis were in
terms of total periodic output, but that would defeat the purpose of trying to look at
the margins along which output is produced. Nevertheless, by looking at periodic
output, it is possible to derive important conditions in terms of G and d. For any
stock size, the short-run minimum profitable operation point occurs when the price
of output equals the marginal cost of output at the minimum point on the averageShort-Run Vessel Behavior 133
variable cost of output. Given the variable cost function, average variable cost of
output is:4
VC () [ ] () Rd VC R C VC Rd G d =+ + (5)
The first order conditions for a minimum with respect to d and G are:
∂∂ = + VC d C VC d dd [] (6)
∂∂ [] ∂∂ [] =+ + [] VC G R G VC C VC d R GG d () (7)
The term on the left-hand side of equation (7) can be interpreted as the marginal
cost of daily output. Average cost of output is minimized where the MC of a fishing
day is equal to the AVC of a fishing day, which is where the AVC of a fishing day is
a minimum. Call this d⊕ . The G that must be used with d⊕  to minimize the AVC of
output is where the marginal cost of output is equal to the overall average variable
cost of output where the latter is calculated taking into account the average cost of a
fishing day when d is equal to d⊕ . Call this G⊕ . Since VCd is not a function of X, d⊕
will be a constant for any set of cost parameters. However, the G⊕  that will be used
with it will vary with stock size. It follows that if equations (3a) and (4a) generate a
combination of G* and d*, where G* < G⊕  and d* < d⊕ , net returns minus variable
costs will be negative, and the vessel will not operate.
Vessel operation in terms of G and d can be described using figures 1 and 2. In
figure 1, if price is P1, G* will be as indicated [see equation (3a)].5 The first term on
the left-hand side of equation (4a), PR(G*, X) – VCG(G*), is represented by area
abcd. For ease of exposition, this will be called net returns per fishing day, NRd(G).
NRd(G) is important because it determines the opportunity cost of lost revenue for
nonfishing days [see equation (4a′ )]. As P falls, NRd(G) decreases, and it will equal zero
at P = P0 when the optimal G is G0. The important point here is that the returns to fishing
must not only cover the cost of the fishing activity, but there must also be enough
left over to cover the other boat operation costs. Therefore, G⊕ , as defined above,
must be greater than G0, the minimum point on the average variable cost curve of G.
It has already been shown that G* and NRd(G) vary directly with P, and they
also vary directly with stock size. An increase in stock size will increase ∂ R/∂ G,
which will increase G* and NRd(G).
Figure 2 plots costs and returns in terms of d, the number of fishing days per
trip. Ignore, for the moment, the lower two curves. The minimum of the AVC per
fishing day is d⊕ , as defined above. The return per fishing day is NRd(G), as deter-
mined in figure 1. The graphical depiction of d* is not as simple as that of G*. From
equation (4a), it can be seen that it will occur to the left of d1 where NRd(G) =
MC(d) and profit per trip is maximized. It also follows from the above that d* must
be greater than or equal to d⊕ .
In order to investigate the effects of regulations, it is necessary to be more spe-
cific about where in the above range d* will be. This can be done by modifying
equation (4a′ ) as follows:
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d d PR VC d d d VC d C VC d d d s lo Gs lo d d s lo +− + + = ∂ ∂ − + + + (4a″ )
4 The number of trips will be a factor in both the numerator and denominator, but they will cancel out.
5 In order to use standard cost curve analysis, it is assumed without loss of generality that ∂ R/∂ G is constant.Anderson 134
This says that given G*, the seasonal profit maximum will occur where the average
opportunity cost of lost revenue (a decreasing function of d) is equal to the differ-
ence between marginal and average cost of a trip day. For ease of exposition, the left-
hand side will be called AOC(G), and the right-hand side will be called (MC – AVCtrip).
The curves of these two equations are plotted in the lower half of figure 2. AOC(G) is
the downward sloping curve which begins on the vertical axis at NRd(G). Since AVC
per trip day is less than AVC per fishing day, (MC – AVCtrip) enters the positive
quadrant to the left of d⊕ . The d that will maximize seasonal profit occurs at the in-
tersection of these two curves. This formulation, while somewhat awkward, has the
advantage that only the AOC(G) curve will change with G. Therefore, it is easy to
see how regulations which will affect G will also affect d*.
Using this graph, it is possible to describe how d* will change with changes
in P and X. Since NRd(G), and, hence, AOC(G), vary directly with both P and
X, an increase in either will shift both curves up. Since the change in P or X
will not affect the (MC – ACtrip) curve, it follows that d* will go up with in-
creases in P and X and vice versa.
Consider the situation where P is such that G* = G⊕ . It follows that NRd(G)
will be tangent to the minimum of the average cost of fishing day curve, which
means that, in this case, d1 will equal d⊕ . It can also be shown that at this price
level, d* will also equal d⊕ .6 At this point, net returns above variable costs per
trip will equal zero. The analysis has shown that as price or stock size is de-
Figure 1.  Optimal Amount of Gear
The selection of G* and d* is an interdependent process. The optimal amount of
gear per day is where the value of the marginal product is equal to the marginal
cost. This level of G determines the net revenue per day, which is a factor in deter-
mining the optimal number of fishing days.
6 To do so, it is necessary to show equation (4a″ ) is equivalent to NRd = ∂ VCd/∂ d when ∂ VCd/∂ d = (C + VCd)/(d).
Solving (4a″ ) for NRd, substituting (C + VCd)/(d) for ∂ VCd/∂ d, and factoring out (C + VCd)/(d) yields:
N R d C V C d d dddd d dd d s lo s lo s lo =+ [] ++ + − + [] ( ) ( ) () () .
Since the term in brackets is equal to 1, the equivalence is demonstrated.Short-Run Vessel Behavior 135
creased from levels that will generate returns above variable costs, d⊕ , d*, and
d1 will decrease and will be the same at prices or stock sizes where net returns
just cover variable costs. Although this is a short-run analysis, it should be
noted that in the long-run, vessels must operate at a combination of G and d
where returns above variable costs are equal to annual fixed cost. This means
that the long-run levels will be such that G* > G⊕  and d* > d⊕ .
This same analysis can be described in terms of expansion paths and isoquants
for periodic output plotted in (d, G) space. For a given season length and stock size,
any point in this space represents a level of periodic output. Therefore, it is possible
to draw isoquants for seasonal output, y, using the following equation.
yD d d d R G d is lo =+ + [] () ( ) . (8)
Several such isoquants are drawn in figure 3. It is a simple matter to show that these
curves are convex to the origin as shown. The expansion path shows the optimal
combinations of d and G that will be used to produce a specific level of output. That
is, the point at which the expansion path intersects an isoquant is the cost-minimiz-
ing combination of d and G to produce that level of output. From the above, the
shape of the expansion path for a given stock size is as pictured in the figure. That
analysis showed that as the profit maximizing level of output increased, the optimal
amount of both G and d would also increase. But since profit maximization requires
the cost-minimizing combination of G and d for any level of output, it follows that
as output is increased, the cost-minimizing levels of G and d will both increase. An
expansion path will intersect the horizontal axis at the level of G where AVCG is at a
minimum (see G0 in figure 1). The operational part of the expansion path is where d
is greater than or equal to d⊕ , and G is greater than G⊕ .
Figure 2.  Optimal Number of Fishing Days
The net return per day, NRd(G), is determined by the selection of the optimal
amount of G. While operating at d1, where marginal return per day equals marginal
cost per day, will maximize per-trip profit; maximization of seasonal profits re-
quires the balancing of net marginal profit per fishing day with average profit per
trip day. This will occur at the intersection of the AOC(G) and the (MC – AVCtrip)
curves. See explanation in text.Anderson 136
Using the expansion path and the isoquants, one can consider optimal vessel op-
eration as follows. Given a price and stock size, the vessel owners will want to
move out the expansion path as long as the marginal revenue from moving to a
higher isoquant is greater than marginal cost. Or to put it another way, the solution
to equations (3a) and (4a) is the point on the expansion path where marginal revenue
of output is equal to marginal cost of output. These expansion paths can be very use-
ful for the economic analysis of regulations. If it can be shown that the regulation
will cause the vessel to move off an expansion path when it changes output levels,
there will be economic inefficiency.
It should be noted that because a change in stock size can change the slope of
the isoquants differently depending on the size of ∂ R/∂ G, it is best to use the analy-
sis of figures 1 and 2 to consider changes in stock size.
In the analysis to follow, it will be useful to determine the effect of a specific
regulation on total harvest as well as on the chosen combination of G and d. To look
at this formally, note that T(d + ds + dlo) = D, where T is the number of trips. When
D is a constant, the following must hold:
∆∆ Td d d d T s lo () ++ + = 0 (9)
Therefore,
∆∆ Td T d d d s lo =− + + () . (10)
Let y represent total periodic harvest, which is equal to TRd. It follows that:
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ y TRd T R G d dR =+ + [] () . (11)
Figure 3.  Seasonal Output Isoquants and Expansion Path
Given stock size and season length, seasonal output isoquants can be represented in
(d, G) space. The expansion path represents the cost-minimizing combination of d and
G for any level of seasonal output. Regulations will produce inefficiencies in produc-
tion if they cause operators to operate off of the curve.Short-Run Vessel Behavior 137
Substituting equation (10) into equation (11) yields
∆∆ ∆ ∆ yT d R ddddd R G d s lo s lo =+ + + [] + {} () ( ) ( ) . (12)
If ds and dlo both equal zero, the first term in brackets will equal zero, and the
change in y will be completely explained by the change in G, because all days will
be fishing days. If either or both ds and dlo are positive, a change in d will change the
number of days which are actually spent fishing, and this will affect total catch; i.e.,
an increase in d means fewer layover or steaming days per period.
Constraints, Lineariaties, Twice Differentiable Functions, Corner
Solutions, and Real-World Fisheries
There is a fine line between setting up a model that will produce clear results and
the interpretation of those results for policy purposes. Therefore, before using this
model to analyze the effects of regulations, it will be useful to make some explicit
comments. For example, while G is viewed as a continuous variable, in the real
world, catch-per-day may be only a function of stock size. More realistically, G may
be multi-dimensional, and R may have a finite upper limit. For example, if catch per
tow increases, it may be worthwhile to increase the crew in order to clean the deck
faster and get the gear back in the water. However, there are only so many tows that
can be made in a 24-hour period.
Similarly, there may be a constraint on d because the crew will only stay
out at sea so long or because of the perishability of the fish. At the extreme,
boats become day trippers and fish inshore waters, with steaming time ap-
proaching zero and layover time equal to a good night’s sleep. Also, layover
days may be a factor of the time the crew demands to be onshore, which may
change as the opportunity cost increases due to season closures or TACs, etc. In
addition, there may be a constraint on hold capacity, so the trip must end when
Rd equals hold capacity. In cases where the marginal costs of G or d are low or
linear, these constraints may be the critical factors in determining vessel behav-
ior, not the solutions of the above equations. While it is not possible to discuss
each of these possibilities when looking at a particular regulation, the results
presented below should be interpreted accordingly.
Analysis of Regulation Types
This section will describe the effects of different regulations on G, d, T, and, hence,
on annual output. While profits will always fall because of the constraints on behav-
ior, annual output can actually increase in a few cases. The discussion will differen-
tiate exactly what kinds of inefficiencies are introduced. Regulations can result in
the inefficient use of variable inputs, the inefficient combination of G, d, and T, or
the forced idleness of vessels.
One of the interesting aspects of nonaccess control regulations is the tragedy of
their own success. If they are successful in increasing stock size, they will provide
incentives for operators to increase production, which will counteract that success.
As a start toward a longer-term analysis, the effects of an increase in stock size on
the above parameters will be described. The results are summarized in table 1,
where the arrows indicate the direction of change assuming the vessel is able to con-
tinue operating under the regulation.Anderson 138
Table 1
Effects of Regulation on Gear Usage per Day, Days
Fishing per Trip, Number of Trips, and Seasonal Output
Initial Change Change As Stock Size Increases
G dTyGdTy
Daily Catch Limit ➷ ➷➹➷ none ➹➷➹
Trip Length Limit none ➷➹➷➹ none ➷➹
Trip Catch Limit ➷ ➷➹➷➹➹➷➹
Layover Days none ➹➷ ? ➹➹➷➹
Trip Number limit none ➹➷➷➹➹ none ➹
Gear Restrictions
  Marginal Cost G
  or ∂ R/∂ G ➷ ➷➹➷➹➹➷➹
Gear Restrictions
  Fixed Cost G none none none none ➹➹➷➹
Gear Restrictions
  Marginal Cost d none ➷➹➷➹➹➷➹
Gear Restrictions
  Fixed Cost d none ➹➷➹➹➹➷➹
Season Length or
  Days at Sea none none ➷➷➹➹➷➹
TAC none none ➷➷➹➹➷➹
IQ ➷➷ ➹ (?) ➷➹➹➷ none
ITQ ➷➷ ➹ ➷  ( ? ) ????
Daily Catch Limits
With a daily catch limit of R,7 the Lagranian for constrained profit maximization is
L =+ + + − πλ Dd d d R R GX s lo () [ ( , ) ] (13)
The first order conditions for a maximum are equation (4a″ ), the constraint and
PR G V C G R G d d d d D Gs lo ∂∂− ∂ ∂ = ∂∂ + + [] ( ) λ (14)
If R is less than R(G*) for the existing price and stock size, the regulation will be a
binding constraint on the use of G (see figure 1). The decrease in G will shift the
NRd(G) and the AOC(G) curves down. The constrained optimal d will occur at the
intersection of the reduced AOC(G) curve and the (MC – ACtrip) curve in figure 2,
and the vessel will reduce d. The decrease in d means that the number of trips will
increase. If R is reduced such that NRd(G) is below the AVC per fishing day curve,
the vessel will cease operation.
Since both ∆ G and ∆ d are negative, it follows from equation (12) that seasonal
output will fall. The ultimate goal of the regulation to reduce catch will be success-
ful. Even if no boats cease production, output will fall. However, this comes at the
7 This assumes that there is on-board monitoring or that the authority knows what the steaming time to
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expense of economic efficiency. The new output will not be produced at the cost
minimizing combination of G and d. This can be seen in figure 3. Let point A on the
expansion path be the operation point without regulation. Given the one to one cor-
respondence between R and G, the daily catch constraint is represented by the verti-
cal line at G where R = R(G, X). Given this constraint, the production bundle could
change to point D, but, as shown, profits will not be maximized at the constrained
level of G if d is not decreased. The new optimum level of d will be somewhere di-
rectly below point D on the G line. At point B on the expansion path, marginal rev-
enue is greater than marginal cost, because without the constraint, the firm chooses
point A. With the constraint, the only way to increase output at point C is to increase
d. Therefore, the new d will be between D and B. Since this is not on the expansion
path, the vessel will not be using the cost minimizing combination of G and d. Part
of the inefficiency will be in the extra steaming and layover days which result from
the increased number of trips.
If X does increase as a result of the regulation, the level of G, which is neces-
sary to harvest R, will decrease. This will increase NRd(G) and AOC(G) curves in
figure 2 because of the lowered cost of harvesting R. It can be seen that this will
cause the optimal d to increase, which from equation (12) means that catch will in-
crease. An increase in d will decrease the number of trips, which will decrease the
number of nonfishing days and will make more days available for fishing. There-
fore, periodic catch will increase.
Length of Trip Limit
With a limit on the length of trip equal to d, the Lagrangian for constrained profit
maximization is:
L =+ + + − + πλ Dd d d d d d s lo s ( ) [ ( )]. (15)
The first order conditions for a maximum are equation (3a), the constraint and
() ( ) ( ) d d PR VC d d d s lo Rs lo +− + + (16)
=∂ ∂ − + + + + + + VC d C VC d d d d d d D dd s lo s lo () ( ) ( ) λ
If d is less than current d*, the regulation will affect vessel behavior. While the opti-
mal level of G will not change, d will equal (d – ds), which means that in figure 2,
the vessel will operate where the difference between the AOC(G) and (MC – ACtrip)
curves is positive. The decrease in d will allow the number of trips to increase, but
from equation (12), periodic catch will fall.
The change in vessel behavior can be explained in terms of figure 3, where the
constraint is shown as a horizontal line at d – ds. If point A is the status quo opera-
tion point, at the very least the constraint will move the operation point to E. The
firm can operate anywhere on the constraint line if that will increase profits. From
the analysis above, it follows that G* is still the profit-maximizing level of G, so it
will make sense to stay at point E. To look at it in terms of the output expansion
path, the firm will increase production along the path until it reaches point B. Then
the allowable expansion path becomes the horizontal line at (d – ds). MR will be
greater than MC for increases in G along that line until G equals G*. Again, the
regulation causes the firm to move off the cost minimizing output expansion path.
As stock size increases, d must stay the same, but G and, thus, catch will increase.Anderson 140
Trip Catch Limits
The Lagrangian for maximizing periodic profits subject to a trip catch limit of H is:
L D d d d H dR G s lo =+ + + − πλ ( ) [ ( )]. (17)
The first order conditions with respect to G and d are:
PR G V C G R Gd d d D Gs lo ∂∂− ∂ ∂ =∂∂ + + λ () (18)
() ( ) ( ) d d PR VC d d d s lo Gs lo +− + + (19)
=∂ ∂ − + + + + + + VC d C VC d d d R d d d D dd s lo s lo ( ) () () λ
As long as the constraint is binding, constrained G will occur before P∂ R/∂ G equals
∂ VCG/∂ G, and the regulation will cause G to fall. The decrease in G will cause the
AOC(G) curve to shift down. This, in itself, will cause a reduction in d, but, in addi-
tion, the constrained optimal point occurs to the left of where the lowered AOC
curve intersects the (MC – ACtrip) curve. The reduction in d will result in an increase
in the number of trips, and, from equation (12), periodic output will fall as well.
The reason both G and d will decrease with trip catch constraints is straightfor-
ward. Compared to its unconstrained behavior, the vessel will have to reduce trip
output, and there are two margins along which this can be done: output per day and
days per trip. It will cut back along both margins such that the marginal reduction in
profit will be the same. This can be interpreted in terms of figure 4. Assume that
with no regulation the vessel would operate at point A at G* and d*. The seasonal
catch isoquant through this point is y1. This means that trip catch equals R(G*)d* =
H*. If the trip catch constraint is to be binding, then H must be less that H*. Let
curve H* be the trip catch isoquant which goes through the point (d*, G*), which is
the collection of points on the following curve:
RGd H () . * = (20)
Compare this with the annual catch isoquant y1, which is represented by an equation
analogous to equation (8). It can be seen that the curves will have different slopes,
and whether the curve for H* or y1 has the steeper slope will depend upon the values
of D, ds, and dlo. In the graph, it is assumed that y1 has the steeper slope. Let the
curve labeled H be the trip isoquant for the constrained trip harvest. The expansion
path becomes the H isoquant beyond point B. At point B, marginal revenue is
greater than marginal cost. Given the relative slopes of the two sets of isoquants,
seasonal output will increase by moving in a SE direction along the H isoquant. Be-
cause it has been shown that both G and d will decrease, marginal revenue will
equal marginal cost somewhere between points B and C, and the firm will not oper-
ate on the expansion path.
Note that as stock increases, both G and d will increase, which increases output.
Layover Days
The effects of a layover day program, which force vessels to remain in port between
trips longer than they otherwise would, can best be explained by referring to theShort-Run Vessel Behavior 141
Figure 4. Seasonal Output Isoquant and Trip Output Isoquant
The y1 isoquant is for seasonal output, while the H isoquants are for trip output. If
H is the isoquant for the trip catch constraint, then as the firm moves out the expan-
sion path, it must stop at point B. However, increases in seasonal output are pos-
sible by moving off the expansion path and down the H isoquant to point C.
general equations (2), (3), and (4). Let dlo represent the required number of layover
days, where dlo > dlo. If this is inserted in the profit function (2) in place of dlo, the
first order condition for G, equation (3), will not change. However in equation (4),
the increase in total trip days caused by the extra layover time will lower the aver-
age profit per trip day. This means that d will have to be increased in order to equate
the marginal profit per day to the lowered average profit per trip day. Therefore,
while G will not change, the constrained optimal d will be higher. The higher dlo and
the increase in d will mean that the number of trips will decrease. There will be two
types of inefficiencies. The vessel will be required to remain idle for days that it
otherwise could have fished, and this will influence the choice of d such that the
cost minimizing combination of G and d will not be used.
Performing the same analysis as with equation (12), but including dlo as a vari-
able, it can be shown that
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ yTd R d d dd d d R d dd d R G d s lo s lo lo s lo =+ + + [] −+ + [] + {} ( ) ()() . (12a)
The increase in d will increase catch, but the increase in dlo will decrease it. Since
∆ G is zero, the change in catch will depend upon the relative changes in d and dlo.
Catch will actually increase if the following holds:
∆∆ dR d dd lo s lo >+ () ( ) .
If this is so, the regulation will have an adverse effect on both efficiency and conser-
vation.Anderson 142
It may appear that mandatory layover days will have the same effect as a season
length restriction because both reduce the number of allowable days on the water.
However, there are differences for both vessel and industry operation. As is shown
below, season length restrictions have no effect on G and d in the short-run. Indus-
try-wide effects are different because a seasonal closure causes fishing to cease for
part of the potential fishing period. However, with mandatory layover days, there
will be incentives for vessels to spread their activity over the period so that proces-
sors can operate for the full period.
Trip Number Limits
To analyze restrictions on the number of trips that may be taken in any period, it is
necessary to reformulate the profit maximizing problem to consider the possibility
that the limit on the number of trips may make the D constraint nonbinding. Vessels
maximize profits subject to the season-length constraint and the trip-limit constraint.
Letting T represent the number of trips, and Tmax be the constraint on trips, the ap-
propriate Lagrangian and the first order conditions with respect to G, d, and T are:
L =+ − + + [] +− TD T d d d T T s lo πλ λ 12 () ( ) max (21)
PR G V C G G ∂∂− ∂ ∂ = 0 (22)
PR VC VC d G d −− ∂ ∂ = λ 1 (23)
PRd dVC C VC d d d G d s lo −− − = + + + λλ 12 () . (24)
Comparing equation (22) with equation (3a), it can be seen that there will be no
effect on G. It can also be shown that d will increase if the Tmax constraint is
binding, but to do so, it is necessary to specify whether one or both constraints
are binding. When the constraint on trips makes the seasonal constraint non-
binding, λ 1 will equal zero. In that case, the optimal d will be where NRd equals
∂ VCd/∂ d (see d1 in figure 2). The overall problem reduces to maximizing profit
per trip. When both constraints are binding, equations (23) and (24) can be
combined to produce
( ) ( ) () () d d PR VC d d d d d d s lo Gs lo s lo +− + + + + + λ 2
=∂ ∂ − + + + VC d C VC d d d dd s lo () ( )
AOC G d d d MC AVC s lo trip () ( ) ( ) ++ + = − λ 2
In terms of figure 2, the constrained optimal d will be to the right of where the
AOC(G) and the (MC – ACtrip) curves intersect. The constrained optimal d will be
greater than d*. Because of the constraint, T will decrease to Tmax. The change in
catch will depend upon the net effect on the total number of actual fishing days per
season. The reduction in trips will reduce them, but the increase in fishing days per
trip will increase them.
Although a binding constraint on the number of trips will redefine the seasonal
isoquants, the effect of limits on the number of trips can be explained in terms of the
expansion path. Since trip number constraints do not affect the choice of G, the onlyShort-Run Vessel Behavior 143
question is the appropriate level of d. If both the season limit and the trip number
limit are binding constraints, the following must hold.
TD d d d s lo max () =+ +
This means that the minimum number of fishing days per trip must equal the follow-
ing if all the allowable days on the water, D, are to be used.
dD T d d s lo min max . =− −
The dmin for three different Tmax limits are depicted in figure 5, where Tmax1 > Tmax2 >
Tmax3. Let point A be the status quo operation point and d1 be the trip length
which maximizes trip profits. If Tmax1 is the operable constraint, dmin1 is the
minimum number of fishing days per trip that insure that all days in the season
are used when T = Tmax. Since d* is larger than dmin1, the boat will choose to op-
erate at d*, and the trip limit will not be binding. If Tmax2 is the constraint, and
the vessel sets d equal to d*, it will not use the full fishing season. While it
can’t increase the number of trips, it can increase the fishing days per trip. If it
increases d to dmin2, it will use the full season. Since the marginal revenue for
the extra days fished per trip will be greater than the marginal cost, it makes
sense to do so. If Tmax3 is the constraint, trip length will have to equal dmin3 in
order to use the full season. However, since marginal revenue per day fished is
less than marginal cost beyond d1, the vessel will set d equal to d1 and remain
idle part of the season.
As stock size increases, both R and d will increase, while T will remain at the
constrained level.
Figure 5. Trip Number Limits and Length of Trip
A limit on the number of trips will not affect the chosen level of G. However, as
long as it is a binding constraint, the firm will extend fishing days per trip to the mini-
mum number necessary to take advantage of the full fishing season, provided that the
minimum is less than d1, the number of days which maximizes profits per trip.Anderson 144
Gear Restrictions
Gear restrictions affect the choice or use of inputs, and to the extent that they are
binding constraints, they will increase costs. The exact effect this will have on ves-
sel operation will depend upon which types of costs (fixed or variable) and which
types of activities (G or d) are affected. The different cases are discussed below. For
convenience, the profit maximizing equations for G and d are repeated.
PR G V C G G ∂∂− ∂ ∂ = 0 (3a)
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . d d PR VC d d d VC d C VC d d d s lo Gs lo d d s lo +− + + = ∂ ∂ − + + + (4a″ )
First, gear restrictions can reduce ∂ R/∂ G or increase ∂ VCG/∂ G. Both will decrease G
and shift the NRd(G) and AOC(G) curves down, which will decrease d. There will
be two types of inefficiencies. First, each level of R will be produced at a higher
cost than is necessary (either because it takes more G to generate it or it costs more
to produce the same amount of G). In addition, G and d will not be used in the ap-
propriate combination.
Second, they can increase VCG in such a way that ∂ VCG/∂ G is not changed. This
will not affect the choice of G and d, and, hence, will not in and of itself affect
catch. However, since it will reduce profits, there may be a decrease in catch due to
exit of firms. This is really an all or nothing way to achieve conservation.
Third, the restrictions can increase ∂ VCd/∂ d. Such an increase will also increase
VCd/(d + ds + dlo), but the increase in the average cost will be smaller than the in-
crease in marginal cost at any given level of d because the increase is averaged over
all days. Therefore, the (MC – ACtrip) curve in figure 2 will shift up, and the inter-
section with the unchanged AOC curve will occur at a lower d. Since G will not
change and d will fall, from equation (12) periodic output will fall.
Finally, VCd can be increased in such a way that ∂ VCd/∂ d is not affected, or set-
up costs or the cost of layover days can be increased. This will decrease the (MC –
ACtrip) curve, which will cause an increase in d. From equation (12) it can be seen that
this will actually increase annual harvest, although it will decrease profits. Here again,
we have the peculiar effect that a regulation hurts both the fishermen and the stock.
In all cases, an increase in stock which results from the regulation, will result in
increases in G and d.
Season Length, Days at Sea, and TACs
For the most part, the effect of these three types of regulations on the short-run be-
havior of vessels is the same. As shown above, the choice of G and d is invariant to
D, and since the immediate effect of all three is to reduce D, there will be no change
in G and d. Season length and limited days at sea directly reduce D, and a TAC will
do so indirectly because the fishery will be shut down when the allowable catch is
taken. In the short-run, when operators cannot change their vessels, the season
length will be a function of the size of the TAC and the number and catch rate of
existing vessels; that is, DTAC = TAC/nR(G*)d*. Therefore, in the short-run, these
regulations will not affect output or efficiency on any one trip, but there will be an
inefficiency and reduced seasonal output due to forced idleness of the vessels.
There are some differences, however. With days at sea, it is likely that the pe-
riod over which fish are landed will not be reduced as it is with shortened seasons. It
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that all vessels are not shut down at the same time. This is important, because ineffi-
ciencies in the processing sector due to capital idleness, which will occur with sea-
son closures, will not necessarily occur with days-at-sea limitations.
Also, if dlo is determined by the crew’s preferences for leisure, as well the tech-
nical realities of turning a boat around, these preferences may change with season
restrictions and TACs. Leisure time during the shortened season may take on a lower
value due to the possibility of increased leisure time during the off season. This means
that dlo may be reduced, which would produce the opposite effects of a mandatory
layover day regulation (see above). Similarly, if there are personal constraints on G
or d, there will be incentives to change them in order to increase seasonal income.
Note again that this is a short-run analysis. Over time, there will be incentives
to modify boats to obtain higher catch rates if the increased revenue from winning
the race to fish can cover the higher costs.
IQs
In an IQ program, a specified amount of catch per period is allocated to each opera-
tor. The exact effect on vessel operation will depend on the relationship between the
catch constraint and the D constraint. If IQ is the fixed, nontransferable allowable
harvest, the appropriate Lagrangian for profit maximization is:
L =+ − + + [] +− [] T D T d d d IQ TR G d s lo πλ λ 12 () ( ) . (25)
The first order conditions with respect to G, d, and T are
PR G V C G R G G ∂∂− ∂ ∂ = ∂∂λ 2 (26)
PR VC VC d R G d −− ∂ ∂ = + λλ 12 (27)
PRd dVC C VC d d d Rd G d s lo −− − = + + + λλ 12 () .(28)
If IQ is more than would be harvested under normal conditions, the quota constraint
is nonbinding, and λ 2 equals 0. Expression (26) becomes equal to (3a) and equations
(27) and (28) can be combined to produce equation (4a″ ). There will be no effect on
vessel behavior.
At the other extreme, if IQ is so small that the full season is not necessary to
produce it, the season constraint is nonbinding, and λ 1 equals zero. In that case, sub-
stituting equation (26) into both equations (27) and (28) yields:
[] [ ] [ ] ∂∂ ∂ ∂ = + ∂∂ VC G R G VC VC d R GG d (27a)
[] [ ] ( ) . ∂∂ ∂ ∂ = + + [] VC G R G VC C VC d R GG d (28a)
These two conditions can hold simultaneously only if ∂ VCd/∂ d = [C + VCd]/d. Therefore,
the solution of these equations will be G⊕  and d⊕  as defined above [see equation (7)].
The case where both constraints are binding can be explained by rewriting equa-
tion (26) as:
() PR G V C G G −∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = λ 2 0Anderson 146
and combining equations (27) and (28) to produce:
() ( ) ( ) ddd dd P R V C s lo s lo G ++ + [] −− [] λ 2
=∂ ∂ − + + + VC d C d VC d d d dd s lo () ( ) . 00
Note that these two equations are analogous to equations (3a) and (4a″ ), which
means that if both constraints are binding, seasonal production will be less than
it otherwise would have been, but the optimal combination of R and d for the
constrained level of output will be used.
These results can be summarized using figure 3. Again, let point A be the
status quo operation point. If IQ is greater than y1, the vessel will continue to
operate at point A. If IQ is less than y3, the full season will not be required to
harvest it. Recall that the isoquants are defined in terms of season length. The
vessel will operate at G⊕  and d⊕ , and the number of trips will be IQ/R(G⊕ )d⊕ .
While the boat will use the cost-minimizing combination of G and d for the re-
stricted output, it will be forced to remain idle part of the season. However, just
because some boats may not operate full time because of their allocation, this
does not necessarily mean that the fishery as a whole cannot operate the full
season, if boats stagger their production schedules.
 If IQ is between y3 and y1, the vessel will operate where the isoquant for
the allowable catch intersects the expansion path, and the allowable harvest will
be produced as efficiently as possible. The number of trips will be D/(d + ds +
dlo). However, overall fleet-wide efficiency is not guaranteed, because the mar-
ginal cost of seasonal output may not be the same for all boats (see the next
section).
The effect of IQs on the number of trips taken requires more explanation.
Starting at point A in figure 3, if an IQ constraint were gradually reduced, opti-
mal d would decrease, which would increase the number of trips. Given the re-
stricted output, profit can be maximized by shortening the trip to lower the mar-
ginal cost per day. However, once the IQ constraint gets to y3, further reduc-
tions will decrease the number of trips because it no longer makes sense to de-
crease d. At d⊕  and G⊕ , AVC per fishing day is minimized.
As X increases, G and d will increase, but the output must stay the same.
This means that the number of trips will decrease. In some cases, an increase in
X could alter the situation by changing the seasonal constraint from binding to
nonbinding.
ITQs
The difference between IQs and ITQs is that individual operation is not deter-
mined by the initial quota allocation, but rather by the market allocation of the
annual harvest rights. In order to analyze this, it is necessary to assume a per-
fectly functioning market for current period harvest rights. In such a situation,
individual operation will depend upon the number and types of vessels in the
existing fleet, the stock size, and the TAC; that is, it will depend upon the de-
mand and supply of annual harvest rights. The vessel demand curve for annual
harvest rights can be derived directly from the previous section. The
Lagrangian multiplier on the quota constraint, λ 2, is the shadow value of the
marginal unit of annual harvest. It is the price the vessel owner would be will-
ing to pay for another unit of annual quota. Call this PITQ. Recall that if theShort-Run Vessel Behavior 147
quota constraint is greater than or equal to the amount the vessel would have
otherwise produced (i.e., greater than R(G*)d*[D/(d* + ds + dlo)]), λ 2 will equal
zero. Call this output level y*. As the amount of annual harvest is reduced, λ 2
will increase. For any stock size and output price, the collection of annual out-
put levels and the corresponding λ 2 points will trace out the vessel’s demand
curve for annual quota. The maximum a vessel owner can pay for an annual
quota occurs when the vessel is operating where the average variable cost of
output is minimized. This occurs where G and d are equal to G⊕  and d⊕ , respec-
tively, and output equals R(G⊕ )d⊕ [D/(d⊕  + ds + dlo)]. Call this output level y⊕ .
Therefore, this maximum price will equal
PP G d X y max (,, ) . =− []
⊕⊕ ⊕ VC
This demand curve is pictured in figure 6. Note that there is a minimum produc-
tion level. At quota prices higher than Pmax, the vessel will not operate. How-
ever, if PITQ falls to Pmax, the vessel will demand enough annual harvesting
rights to operate for the full season and will produce y⊕ . Operation at any point
on the dotted horizontal part of the curve means that the vessel would be taking
fewer trips than D/(d⊕  + ds + dlo).
The equilibrium PITQ will be determined by the intersection of aggregate de-
Figure 6. Annual Vessel Output with ITQs
Assuming a perfect market in annual quota, a profit maximizing vessel will operate where its marginal
value of output is equal to PITQ. Because of the opportunity cost of using an annual quota, the firm will
lease out any quota it holds beyond that necessary to operate at that output level.Anderson 148
mand and supply, which is the annual TAC (see figure 7). The Pmax in this case
represents the maximum price for the most efficient vessel. The length of the
horizontal, dotted line between the vertical axis and the initial point on the de-
mand curve depends upon the number of existing vessels and the degree of
heterogeniety. If there is complete heterogeniety, the initial point is the y⊕  point
of the most efficient vessel. If all vessels are the same, it will occur at ny⊕ ,
where n is the number of vessels. The length of the horizontal segment is im-
portant as far as a market equilibrium is concerned. If the TAC line intersects
this portion of the curve, there will be an equilibrium price, but it is not pos-
sible to determine how the quota is allocated among the fleet because the quan-
tity demanded will be greater than the quantity supplied at the equilibrium
price. All boats may operate for part of the season, or part of the fleet may op-
erate for the full season.
Consider the case where TAC is equal to TAC2 and the equilibrium price is
P ITQ
* . To see how a vessel will operate, consider figure 6 again. Let Q be the
amount of annual harvest rights held by the vessel. The value of the annual har-
vest right becomes an opportunity cost which the operator must consider when
making production decisions. If  P ITQ
*  is equal to P1, the vessel will not operate
at all, but will lease out all of its annual quota. If  P ITQ
*  is equal to P2, the vessel
will operate, but will rent out some of its annual quota. If  P ITQ
*  is equal to P3,
the firm will operate, but will have to lease in some annual quota. The output
level, rental activity, and vessel profits and quota rents for each PITQ are de-
scribed in the table below the figure.
Vessel operation with ITQs can be analyzed in terms of figure 3. Again, let
point A be the status quo operation point. This is equivalent to producing y* in
figure 6, where PITQ is equal to zero. As PITQ increases from zero to Pmax, the
vessel’s operation point will move from point A down to point C. At prices
above Pmax, the vessel will cease operation. With IQs, the point of operation
Figure 7. Determination of Annual Rental Value of ITQs
The rental value of a unit of annual quota is determined by the intersection of the
aggregate demand curve for that quota (a function of the number of firms, their
cost conditions, and the market price of output) and the annual TAC level. Indi-
vidual firms will use this price in determining their seasonal activity.Short-Run Vessel Behavior 149
will depend upon the amount of annual quota held. The vessel may operate for
less than the full season if the amount of quota held makes the seasonal con-
straint nonbinding. With ITQs, the operation point will depend upon the equi-
librium PITQ . As long as there is a market clearing PITQ, the vessel will operate
for the full season, or it will not operate at all. With ITQs, each vessel will op-
erate on its expansion path, and the cost minimizing combination of G and d
will be used. In addition, since the marginal value of an extra unit of production
will be the same for all vessels due to the optimizing trade in harvesting rights,
the short-run fleet cost of producing the TAC will be minimized as well. Over
time, vessels will tend to enter or exit the fishery according to the difference
between short-run vessel returns net of quota rent and annual fixed costs. The
long-run fleet cost of producing the TAC will be minimized as well.
In this case, the effect of an increase in X as a result of the TAC is more
complex because of the interaction between vessels in the market allocation of
annual quota. An increase in X will shift the demand curve for each vessel to
the right and will increase the Pmax. This will shift the aggregate demand curve
to the right, which will increase the equilibrium PITQ. The operation point for
any one vessel will depend upon where the new equilibrium PITQ intersects its
new demand curve for quota. With heterogenous vessels, it is possible that
some will demand more quota, while some will demand less.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has provided a theoretical analysis of vessel trip behavior. This is
useful because it sheds more light on the actual operating conditions of fishing
vessels, and provides a framework that has heretofore been unavailable for a
detailed examination of different types of regulation. The analysis explains
some of the details concerning the effects of traditional regulations by describ-
ing the different margins along which inefficiencies can be introduced and dem-
onstrating how vessel operation and output will change in the short-run. One
new conclusion is that while binding regulations will always reduce profitabil-
ity, in some cases, they can actually increase annual output. In addition, the pa-
per presents new insights concerning vessel operation under IQs and ITQs, a
subject which has not received much attention in the literature. A summary of
the effects is presented in table 1. Again, the reader is warned to interpret the
results taking into account the above discussion of constraints, lineariaties, etc.
In addition, further research to expand the model to consider multiple fishing
areas and continuous fishing through time rather than a seasonal analysis would
be useful.
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